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SCOTTISH CONSERVATISM- A FAILURE OF ORGANIZATION? 
CPS&evens 
In a recent article, "Thatcherism in a Cold Climate" which appeared in 
the June/July 1989 issue of Radical Scotland, David McCrone, a former 
editor of this Yearbook, surveyed the relationship between Thatcherism 
and Scotland. The apparent failure of the former is not, he suggested, 
merely due to the particular socio-economic structure of the latter. It is 
that: 
fi)n Scotland, the attack on state institutions - the nationalised 
industries, the education system, local government, the public sector 
generally- is perceived as an attack on "Scotland" itself, particularly as 
this attack is dressed up in the rhetoric of Tory England .... Thatcher's 
vision of recreating bourgeois England is out of kilter not only with 
Scottish matcri;Jl interests, but with our own sense ofidentity.(pll) 
In other words, Conservatism lacks a Scottish strategy; one that makes 
sense of separate development, separate identity and separate ideological 
and cultural norms. This situation has been exacerbated since the decline of 
Scottish Conservatism from the early 1970s as a political force able to 
compete realistically for the Scottish popular vote. Whenever the Party is in 
a position to wield executive power it does so not as a result of a democratic 
mandate but as the result of a victory won on English issues south of the 
border. In other words, Scottish Conservatism is imposed externally on its 
constitueney.' 11 . 
Yet, if the result of the 1989 European elections at which the Scottish 
Conservative Party failed to win a single seat underlined the problem, Mrs 
Thatcher's main response to date has reinforced the existing situation. In 
July 1987, Michael Forsyth, a junior minister at the Scottish Office, was 
appointed to replace Lord Goold as Chairman of the Scottish Conservative 
and Unionist Party. Forsyth, still only thirty-four, a one-time Chairman of 
the Federation of Conservative Students, is known rather more for his 
radical free market views than as a Scot. And he is strongly Unionist. A 
clear picture of the views of Scottish Tories in general, and the Scottish 
Conservative and Unionist Association (SCUA) in particular, towards this 
appointment will need greater historical perspective. But there is some 
indication. Forsyth is generally seen as being an opponent of moves to 
develop a distinctive style of Scottish Conservl*tism, associated with, 
among others, Professor Ross Harper, then President of SCUA, himself a 
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possible successor to Goold. Such a style would involve an infusion of 
political pragmatism to win back the middle ground. Forsyth, on the 
contrary is likely to see his role as pushing forward exactly those policies 
which McCrone sees as antithetical to Scottish politics. This seems in line 
with the press image of Thatcherism as meeting electoral reversal with the 
assertion that the policies are right; it is merely their implementation or 
presentation that is inadequate. In other words, don't blame the message, 
it's the medium that's wrong. (Z) 
This article looks not at the Conservative Party performance in 
Scotland - that has been done elsewhere<3l - but at the Scottish 
Conservative Party itself and its structure and organization. The inter-
relationship between political organization and electoral performance 
remains obscure. The inability of political scientists to plot a casual 
relationship has led to an undervaluing of the role of organization, an 
activity on which most party agents exert considerable energy. In the case 
of the Conservative Party, where constituency associations raise money to 
employ agents, an agent who ignores organization may find him or herself 
unemployed through financial pressure. And there seems good evidence to 
suggest that a full-time professionally trained agent will improve party 
performance. Yet the role of organization is limited. Organization can help 
win elections and it can help lose them. But it cannot in itself win elections. 
Organization can help sell a message; but only if someone wants to buy it. 
Conservative organization in Scotland is, moreover, worth examining 
in its own right as a battle ground for the relationship of English and 
Scottish Conservatism. The latter has traditionally been fiercely 
independent of administrative union with the English/Welsh Party while 
being strongly Unionist in politics. The best known example is the rejection 
of the name Conservative in favour of Unionist until 1965. This 
organizational development involved the erosion of Scottish traditions of 
independence, resulting in a united structure in 1977. At the same time, ke~ 
figures moved away from proposals of administrative decentralization,< l 
which characterized 1940s and 1950s Conservatism, towards acceptance of 
a limited measure of political devolution. 
Organization prior to 1965 
Prior to reorganization in 1%5, the central organ of Scottish 
Conservatism was supposedly the Scottish Unionist Association (SUA) 
formed to 1912 when the Conservative and Liberal Unionist Parties were 
united. In reality, however, power lay in the hands of the two area councils, 
the Western Area Council (WDC) and the Eastern Area Council (EDC), 
with the SUA a biennial talking shop. The former was based in Glasgow 
and for the most part shared its professional organization with the Glasgow 
Unionist Association (GUA). Its most famous secretary, John Cranna was 
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Divisions between western and eastern Unionists bedevilled Scottish 
Conservatism throughout the post-war period. Each had different patterns 
of development. Western Unionism, with its strong populist tradition, 
based on Orange and Protestant sentiment, had grown out of the 
Conservative and Liberal Unionist alliance of 1886. Eastern Unionism, 
more Conservative in nature, with a lawyer tradition, owed its strength to 
the realignment of right and left in the 1920s and 1930s. (S) 
Most analyses of Scottish Conservatism have sought to emphasise a 
tradition of independence or autonomy. <6> "Autonomy" is a central feature 
of Conservatism in England and Wales as well. But the two traditions are 
significantly different. As most accounts stress, constitutionally the 
Conservative Party is the Party in Parliament. The Party leader appoints 
the chairman of the Party in England and Wales, who presides over the 
professional machinery in Smith Square at Central Office. Similarly, the 
leader appoints the Chairman of the Scottish Party. In theory, the 
voluntary side of the Party, the National Union of Conservative and 
Unionist Associations at the top of the apex, Conservative Party 
Constituency Associations at the bottom with area councils in between, are 
independent of central control. The head of the professional machinery 
(until recently the Director of Organisation, now the Director of Party 
Campaigning) acts as Secreteary to the National Union. Similarly, the 
Central Office Area Agents, who are employed by Central Office, act as 
Secretaries to the Area Executives. But, these have no authority over their 
respective tier and must serve two masters. Each Constituency Association 
engages and pays its agent, who remains answerable to the constituency 
chair and not to the Central Office Area Agent, and each selects its own 
Parliamentary candidate. This organizational autonomy is a tradition in the 
English!W elsh Party honoured at least in the breach if no longer in the 
observance.(?) 
The situation in Scotland is quite different. It is true as Urwin says that 
Scottish Conservatism has traditionally insisted upon its independence and 
autonomy. However, when he suggests that 'autonomy and independence 
are treasured values throughout the Scottish Party' he is in reality referrin~ 
to the high level of autonomy enjoyed by the two area councils.< 
Constituency autonomy was rather less a reality in Scotland. Associations 
sent "delegates" rather than representatives to the area Councils and these 
in tum were willing to legislate for their constituent bodies. Two examples 
should suffice. In 1949, the EDC intervened to prevent Aberdeen 
Conservatives fighting local government elections on party lines rather 
than to support all anti-socialist candidates. <9> When four associations in 
West Scotland, East and West Renfrewshire, Greenock and Paisley 'formed 
a Federation on 27 February 1952, the WOC ruled that such a Federation 
was unconstitutional offering instead to convene a committee to enable the 
four associations to meet locally. (JO) 
78 
-..,...-
Scottish Government Yearbook 1990 
A second important difference in Scotland concerned the professional 
machinery. Unlike England/Wales where this was under the control of the 
Party Chairman at Central Office, there was no central machinery in 
Scotland. The Scottish Whip's Office became the Scottish chairman's office 
in 1950, with James Stuart as the first Chairman. And it employed a 
political secretary, of which the most famous was Col Patrick Blair, 
(knighted 1958) the incumbent from 1921 to 1960. But there was no other 
professional organization. The Scottish professional staff was employed by 
the two Divisional Councils to whom they were accountable. Moreover, 
there was no central Scottish fund. Instead both Councils had funds and 
they financed in part the Scottish Political Secretary. (H) It is clear that given 
this structure the EDC and WOC convenors and other officer bearers 
played a significantly more important role than the English Area Officers. 
It is not surprising to find the SUA changing its rules in 1949 to enable ex-
convenors of each council to serve on the SUA Executive and Council ex 
officio. (12) 
It was this image, of a political party dominated by an unrepresentative 
few, that the Parliamentary Party sought to remedy in the late 1940s. The 
mechanism was primarily the introduction, apparently universally 
accepted, of a rule restricting the annual subscription to a Constituency 
Association to £25 by a candidate £50 by an MP. (B) This served the purpose 
both of removing an image of well-off aspiring politicians buying seats and 
forcing Associations to acquire a mass membership as a means of finding 
additional sources of income. Successful fund raising requires a full 
canvass, a degree oflocal knowledge, and organizers to operate an effective 
'block' system to enable maximum potential subscriptions to be targeted. 
The whole system was cemented by an appeal to raise a million pounds in 
1947<14> and by the introduction of a 'quota system', by which Associations 
were encouraged to subscribe annual amounts to the centre. Other reforms 
introduced around this period included insistence that only candidates on 
the candidates' list should be adopted, encouragement to Associations to 
form Political Education Committees and to participate in the two-way 
movement, the setting up of Trade Union Committees, and an increase in 
the number of paid professional agents and in the conditions under which 
they worked. 
It should not be thought that these reforms were introduced 
immediately and universally in England and Wales. On the contrary they 
took careful negotiation by Central Office, and by the Area Agents, who 
had only informal influence over constituency association officers and 
Agents. It is worth, however, looking at the passage of the reforms in 
Scotland as an indication of the way it responded to these proposals. 
The major reform, the restriction on subscriptions by MPs and 
candidates, was written into the SUA rules and accepted in Scotland. 
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Whips'/Chairman's Office. But, as in England/Wales, where, into the 
1970s, constituency associations were effectively by-passing the procedure 
by offering as a fait accompli a candidate already selected for inclusion on 
the list, this was often seen as an obstacle through which to get one's chosen 
candidate rather than a resource from which to draw a highly 
professionalized MP. The result was an outbreak of frustration at the 1957 
Conference among Lowland professionals at their inability to secure 
selection for safe seats. <15l More importantly, this did nothing for the 
Party's image, merely reinforcing that it was still run by local Lairds. With 
James Stuart reporting to the WDC in January 1958 that he could do 
nothing centrally to help without infringing constituency autonomy<16l the 
problem had to wait until the electoral downturn of 1959. Even then the 
changes were minor. The candidates' list was to be kept as before in the 
Chairman's Office and he was to interview all aspiring candidates with the 
Scottish Chief Whip. Subsequently candidates were to be interviewed by 
the convenor in the district in which they were to stand. <17l The SUA may 
have wished that constituency autonomy should be overcome in the 
question of candidate selection. But they did not wish to lose that control to 
the Chairman's Office. A memorandum on procedure followed the 
"reforms" stating that all approaches about candidates should be made to 
the relevant Council Office and that the Chairman's Office should merely 
be kept informed. <18l 
A quota system was accepted in principal; but never properly 
implemented. A report in November 1960 noted that, although, a quota 
scheme had been in operation in the Eastern Area for some time, the 
amount asked for was only half that Central Office would have asked of 
En~lish Associations; while the Western Area had no quota scheme at 
all. 19l The SUA recommended that a full quota scheme should be 
introduced. But none was forthcoming. Following the 1966 election once 
again the SUA office bearers met to discuss a quota system only to call for 
one's introduction as soon as possible.<20l 
The quota system was one means of persuading associations to build 
up mass memberships. That membership made the payment of agents 
possible. In England/Wales the Conservative Party made real efforts to 
persuade associations to employ certificated agents and to provide car 
allowances, clerical back-up and membership of superannuation schemes. 
In Scotland, however, there was often resistance to professional agents; 
local gentlemen and part-timers were used instead. Despite a decision by 
the WDC that it was in the interest of the Party to employ professional 
agents and the diversion of resources into employing six trainee agents for 
six months, <21l at the time of the 1955 election only twenty-eight oftlie sixty-
four associations had certified agents and of the thirty-one associations in 
the Eastern Area only twelve had agents in the superannuation scheme. <22l 
Some improvement subsequently took place. By 1957 there were fifty-four 
full-time agents. But Col Blair's report on the subject failed to reveal how 
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many were certificated. At any rate only seventeen were in the Agent's 
pension scheme, a lower percentage than in England, while thirty-eight 
constituencies had clerical help. Moreover, salaries were low; only ten 
received £800 or more and only eight received £100 or more out-of-pocket 
expenses, a level of remuneration and support usual in England.<23l 
Whereas every so often the Chairman of the English/Welsh Party would 
send out a circular letter to each association pointing out what it thought to 
be a new reasonable minimum wage and urging its implementation, the 
SUA objected to such a letter as infringing constituency association 
autonomy. It not only declined to have one sent to Scottish constituency 
association convenors but refused to have a specimen read at its 1954 
Council meeting. <24) Once again, reform was felt necessary following the 
1959 election performance. A joint report by the EDC and WDC called for 
an improvement in the status, salary at~d condition of service for agents. <25l 
Once again nothing was achieved. When the Roxburgh Committee, named 
after Willis Roxburgh, vice-chairman of Scottish Party, reported on the 
role of agents in 1971, it found that nothing had changed. <26l 
One feature of post-war organization south of the border was the 
establishment of Trade Union sections. This took the form of a National 
Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) parallelled by the Industrial 
Department at Central office; with the establishment of TUACs in 
constituencies. By the early 1950s the SUA had rejected the notion that 
there should be a Scottish Conservative Trade Union Movement. A letter 
from the SUA President to Constituency Associations on the sub!ect in 
1950 discovered an overwhelming volume of opinion against it;< 7l but 
nevertheless sanctioned an experiment in which the WDC "allowed" the 
Falkirk and West Stirling Associations to run a trial scheme. <28l By 1953, the 
SUA had decided that the scheme was not appropriate to Scotland, where 
industry and workmen were different. At a SUA Council meeting held 
especially to discuss TUACs, the convenor of the EDC argued that 
separate organization would create what she called a "colour bar" 
suggesting instead the need to recruit trade unionists into the existing 
organization in the way that doctors, lawyers and business men were 
recruited. Col Blair also opposed any scheme. <29l Other advisory 
committees went the same way. With the SUA largely opposing the 
politicization of local elections, preferring instead to support anti-socialists, 
Local Government Advisory Committees were not a feature of Scottish 
organization as they were in England; instead rather unsatisfactory ad hoc 
committees were used. Women's Advisory Committees a central feature of 
English organization were also less common in Scotland. In the case of 
Political Education Committees there was no formal oppositiion to the 
idea. But although there were seventeen groups in the "two way 
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The Process of Reform 
The import of the failure of the Scottish Unionist Party to introduce 
the kind of structure at use south of the border is clear. Constituency 
associations did not develop as mass units, raising the sort of sums of money 
needed to employ professional agents, to run comprehensive canvasses and 
to participate in political education. Too much power was in the hands of 
the Area Councils preventing effective decentralization. The split between 
the West and the East caused problems, while the Highlands, absorbed into 
the two regions felt disenfranchised. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the 
1959 election, the recommendations of the joint EDCIWDC committee 
addressed the issue of constituency structure. In addition to the 
recommendations as to the status of agents noted above, the committee 
recommended the introductioin of political education groups, the 
increased use of advisory committees and an increase in subscriptions. It 
also recommended a reorganization of the Chairman's Office.<31) 
Blair's retirement as Political Secretary occasioned such a 
reorganization. Sir Alick Buchanan-Smith (later Lord Balerno) was 
created Deputy Chairman and MacDonald Watson became Political 
Secretary. The reform was fairly minor. But it occasioned much 
controversy, affecting as it did the relationship between the Scottish 
Chairman's Office and the SUA on the one hand and the relationship 
between the English and Scottish Parties on the other; and subsumed into 
the argument were divisions between the West and East. The creation of a 
Deputy chairman was first suggested in 1953 when James Stuart, began to 
find the duality of jobs as Secretary of State for Scotland and Scottish 
Chairman too much. The SUA unanimously opposed this and the 
suggestion came to nothing. The WDC argued that Col Blair already acted 
in the proposed role and that the creation of such a post would effect the 
executive position of the President of the SUA and increase the power and 
influence of the centre untowardly. Any shift of power away from the SUA 
towards the Scottish Chairman's Office also involved a shift from Glasgow 
where the SUA met to Edinburgh where the EDC and Scottish Chairman 
shared offices. 
Similar problems arose after 1960. The whole rationale of the 
appointment of a deputy-chairman was the wielding of additional executive 
power. As this would be used to encourage constituency associations to 
improve their organisation it would benefit London and the Scottish 
Chairman's Office at the expense of the SUA; and Edinburgh at the 
expense of Glasgow. The project got off to a bad start when the Scotsman 
described MacDonald Watson as the Scottish Chief Agent, an appiication 
of the English system that the SUA found unacceptable.<32l But, conflict 
over authority emerged in 1961 when a circular from Sir William Urton, the 
General Director in London announced that Scottish constituencies should 
be circulated through the Chairman's Office. This ended in hostile 
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condemnation of both Buchanan-Smith and Watson by the SUA and its 
insistence that as the only executive body in Scotland, the Chairman's 
Office being an advisory body, it had to be the recipient of any circulars. <33> 
The problem still had not blown over when in June l962 the SUA reported 
that members of the Chairman's Office had visited constituencies on three 
occasions and recorded that this was an infringement of autonomy. (J4) 
The need for change was once again emphasised by the electoral 
results in 1964. This time the Party underwent substantial changes without 
any real dissent. The reforms, led by Sir John George, Scottish Chairman, 
1963-65, have been described in some detail by Derek Urwin.<35> The 
change of name was finally agreed, with 'Conservative' at last adopted, the 
SUA becoming the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association 
(SCUA). The SCUA and the Chairman's Office were both reorganized, 
the latter becoming in effect a Scottish Central Office (SCO) by which 
name it was increasingly known. Both the WDC and the EDC were 
abandoned and were replaced by five regions, City of Glasgow, Highland, 
North Eastern, Central and Southern, and South West. These had 
Councils. But they were now voluntary bodies. (J6) The professional 
organization was created around the SCO, with a General Director of 
Scottish Organization and a staff which included a Political Officer. The 
Party's finance was to be held by the SCO and there was to be a National 
Treasurer. <37> The Party's national advisory structure was also modified. A 
Trade Union Committee had been set up in 1962 with the historian John 
Ward as its first President. Following the reforms, this became a Trade 
Union Advisory Committee, whose convenor sat on the SCUA Finance 
and General Purposes Committee. A similar role was played by the 
convenors of the newly formed You~ Conservative Advisory Committee 
and Women's Advisory Committee,< which consisted in the first instance 
of all women on the SCUA Councit.<39l Effort was also made to secure a 
policy of support for explicitly Conservative candidates in local elections. 
So, for example, in contrast to the events of 1949, considerable effort was 
made to secure an effective dissolution of the Progressive Movement in 
Aberdeen and to produce an active Conservative Group for the whole city, 
which the SCUA hoped might be used as a model for Conservative groups 
elsewhere. (40) 
These changes aimed to do more than reinvigorate the Scottish Party 
at the centre. Derek Urwin made the point that while the Party Vice-
Chairman emphasised that 'the basic unit is still the constituency ... it was 
obvious that the purpose of the reorganization was greater central 
control. •<41> This is only partly right. The purpose of the reorganization was 
to move power away from the component parts of the SUA towards an 
effective machine based on Central Office and the constituencies. It was 
left to Sir Gilmour Menzies Anderson, Chairman, 1967-1971, to, in the 
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The changes also sought to end the effective division between the East 
and West. This did not go without opposition. Western Unionism had 
grown up around Glasgow, independent of Edinburgh. For Western 
Conservatives the changes meant colonisation by both Edinburgh and 
London. The WDC felt that bad organization was being given the blame for 
the Party's shortcomings whereas it was policy where problems lay. It also 
worried over where its funds would go, as they had been collected for 
electioneering in the West of Scotland and should only be used for that 
purpose.<43) For a time, the SUA continued to meet in Glasgow. The 
process took a further step when in 1971, a special meeting of the SCUA 
voted by seventy-two votes to forty to move the SCUA headquarters to the 
same offices as the SCO in Edinburgh.<44) Yet, to some extent the 
organization has yet again taken on a bifurcated structure. In 1%7, the 
Highland and North East Regions merged<45) and in 1972 Glasgow and SW 
combined into the Western Region,<461leaving just three regions, Central 
and Southern, Western, and Highlands. 
The 1965 reform produced real improvement in Conservative Party 
organization. But it did nothing to reverse the Party's electoral 
performance. Two defeats in 1974 brought a new Party leader; and the new 
Party leader brought two substantial changes in the make-up of Scottish 
Conservatism. These were announced at the 1977 conference. The Party 
abandoned its commitment to a devolved assembly, initially rejected by the 
1973 Conference but accepted by Alick Buchanan-Smith (Lord Balerno's 
son) after the October 1974 election. And the recommendation of the 
Fairgrieve Committee for the union of the Scottish and English/Welsh 
Conservative Parties was announced. The Committee was set up by 
Margaret Thatcher in May 1976. Chaired by Russell Fairgrieve, Chairman 
of the Scottish Conservative Party, 1975-1980, its remit was to examine the 
case for organizational integration. Accordingly, it reported to the SCUA 
Executive Committee on 2 April 1977 and then to the 1977 Conference. 
The Fairgrieve Report acknowledged that reform was needed for three 
reasons. Firstly, it accepted that Finance was available to continue to fund 
Scottish Central Office activities but felt that 'the scope, the 
professionalism, [and] the organisation' needed to be expanded. Secondly, 
it noted that given that 80% of Scottish industry was now owned outside 
Scotland, prospects for raising the additional funding 'were remote'. 
Thirdly, it recognized that 'the average range, the strength and virility' of 
Conservative Associations was lower than in England and that the 
relationship between the SCUA and the Chairman's Office were not as 
close as it should be. In meeting these problems, the Committee considered 
various options, dismissing for example the possibility of merging the 
SCUA into the National Union as an Area. Instead it proposed four major 
changes. Firstly, that administrative, financial and organizational control 
of the Scottish Central Office should be transferred to the Scottish Director 
of Organization. He was to work with his English/Welsh counterpart. 
Secondly, the Chairman of the Scottish Party would continue but he and his 
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deputies should concentrate on political activities. Thirdly, that finance 
should be centralized; although the Scottish Treasurer was to continue to 
collect local monies, the Conservative Board of Finance activities, 
collecting money from corporate donors, would be run from Scotland. 
Lastly, association members would still be members of the SCUA and 
attend Scottish Conference. But they would also be members of the 
National Union, able to attend the National Union Conference. In other 
words the Scottish Party was to be absorbed into the London Party, with a 
small degree of decentralization rather than the devolution which had 
characterized Scottish Unionism. <47) But in return it would acquire access to 
the various departments of Central Office in London and greater influence 
in the counsels of the Party. It achieved the last of these when Russell (now 
Lord) Sanderson became Vice-Chairman of the National Union in 1979 
and then, before he could succeed as Chairman, became Chairman of the 
National Union Executive Committee in 1980. 
Conclusion 
The problems facing Scottish Conservatism were acute in 1965. 
Scottish Conservatism was seen as too aristocratic and too Anglicised. Sir 
Alec Douglas-Home, the first Scottish Prime Minister since J Ramsay 
MacDonald, epitomised the problem. 
By 1%5, he was seen nationally as the image of grouse-moor 
Conservatism; the man whose personality single-handedly lost the 1%4 
election. It was all but inevitable that reform would follow the defeat. If a 
substantial measure of change was secured in 1965, it was at a cost. Scottish 
Conservatism had been reluctant to reform itself, intent instead to cling to 
its Unionist label, its grandee leadership, and its bifurcated and largely non-
participatory structure, centred on two district councils. In the process of 
breaking this down and creating a constituency structure comparable to 
that built up in England in the 1940s and 1950s, the Conservative Party 
eroded the distinctiveness of the Scottish Party. There was little to replace 
it. Sir John George, who piloted through the 1%5 changes, was himself a 
self-made man, the son of a miner. But by the 1960s there was no longer a 
tier of businessmen ready to finance and run the Scottish Party. The 
nationalization of the British economy has removed a distinctly Scottish 
source of income. Socio-economic changes removed its traditional lowland 
base and in the 1970s rural constituencies came under threat from the SNP. 
An alternative image has been hard to find. One possible outcome was a 
Party committed to devolution. But this was abandoned in 1977, 
Buchanan-Smith resigning and Teddy Taylor, an anti-devolutionist, 
replacing him. The problem is circular. The loss of Teddy Taylor's seat in 
1979 removed a potential populist Secretary of State who might redefine 
the Thatcherite creed in Scottish terms. Without MPs and distinctly 
Scottish leadership there is nothing on which to build the image; without 
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Given this decline, the case for the complete integration of the Scottish 
and English Parties is powerful. Russell Fairgrieve, himself a devolutionist, 
announcing the 1977 reforms, noted that it made better sense plugging into 
a 240 volt mains than running from a 12 volt battery. The Scottish 
Conservative Party has not produced a leader of stature, identifiable by his 
or her Scottishness. It makes little sense to maintain a distinctly Scottish 
Party leadership, when Scots themselves identify first and foremost not 
only with Margaret Thatcher but also with her Party Chairman in London. 
Margaret Thatcher's personal style of leadership exacerbates this problem 
in a way that is too familiar to need repeating. This seemed to be the case 
when Mrs Thatcher's response to the serious deterioration of the 
Conservative position at the 1987 General Election was to make a much 
publicised three day visit to Scotland, 3-5 September 1987. 
However, that visit was accompanied by a reorganization at SCO. The 
plan was very much in line with Mrs Thatcher's commitment to put her 
message over better. The Director was replaced by a Chief Executive, Mr 
John MacKay, the former Scottish Office Minister, who was to play a 'hi~h 
profile political role, actively campaigning for the Conservative Party.' 48l 
Five directors, finance, organization, research, communication and 
campaigning, were to run the Party's machinery and there was to be an 
increase in staff from 17 to 25. The reforms were also, according to the 
Scotsman, aimed at 'more autonomy for the Scottish Tories,'<49l not just 
through the creation of a more substantial Scottish establishment but 
through the ending of the 1977 arrangement whereby London held the 
purse strings. The Scotsman announced that Scottish Conservatives were to 
keep all the money raised in Scotland. 
It is still too early to determine what success, if any, the reorganization 
will have. Improvement in constituency organisation is still on the agenda. 
The press coverage following the unfortunate resignation of Professor 
Harper as President of the SCUA has underlined this point. The Scotsman, 
Glasgow Heraldand Scotland on Sunday all emphasised that Professor 
Harper's main priority had been the reinvigoration of Constituency 
organization. (SO) 
In May 1987 the Party had only fourteen agents and Lord Goold 
promised to 'beef-up constituency associations into winning political 
units. •<51l Two years later, the Scotsman reckoned that the Party had 
reasonable organization in twenty-five constituencies and also noted that 
an activist had been appointed to take on the North-east Region. <52l But 
improved organization itself is unlikely to produce an electoral turn-
around. For that the issues will have to move in the Party's favour. 
Moreover, unless they do so, the organization is likely to wither from lack 
of success. And the Conservative Party has one further problem to face; 
that is the uncanny knack of Scotland's electoral geography of producing an 
effective anti-Thatcher candidate in each constituency. 
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If David McCrone's analysis is accurate, the issues are not going to go 
the way of the Scottish Conservative Party unless there is a radical change in 
policy direction. In the light of this, there are two ways to see Michael 
Forsyth's role as Party Chairman. One is as a dynamicforce, acting with the 
authority of the Party leader, to break down the hold of the Scottish Tory 
establishment over the Edinburgh machinery, the logical conclusion of the 
reforms of the 1960s and 1970s. The other is as the embodiment of 
Thatcherism in Scotland, whose emphasis on 'bourgeois England', will fall 
on deaf ears in Scotland. Forsyth has certainly acquired the kind of high 
political profile that John MacKay sought as Chief Executive. The 
Scotsman, not normally friendly to the Conservative Party, painted a 
favourable picture of Forsyth as a new broom, invigorating Party workers 
and organization; which shows at the very least that the changes of 1987-
1989 have had a beneficial effect on the Party's media image. Whether or 
not an improved organization combined with media successes can reverse 
the Party's fortunes without a substantial policy rethink, only time can tell. 
Chris Stevens, Department of Administrative and Social Studies, Teeside 
Polytechnic, Middlesbrough. 
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